Our newest post is by an anonymous Army Lieutenant Colonel who has served at Fort Hood, TX and wishes to discuss what they deems ultimately as leadership failures at multiple levels. The stories and report rocked the US Army in 2020.
Cause and Effect
The recent release of the Fort Hood independent Review Council (FHIRC) findings, based on the investigation into the murder of SPC Guillen, rocked the Army and the nation. Amid multiple claims that Leadership failed to address numerous sexual assault and sexual harassment complaints, the one variable, which continues to stand out given the severity of the situation, is the failure of Leadership to properly address these issues within units in a timely and efficient manner. Multiple reliefs from platoon and company to Installation level commenced, leaving those in the force wondering “what happened? The purpose of this article is not to place blame, or abdicate responsibility, but merely to examine an incremental decay of basic level Leadership responsibilities, which have created the conditions for a ruthless murder to occur within our institutions and reveal a culture of uncaring Leaders. While the Fort Hood Report highlights numerous areas for institutional improvement, within this article are six things Leaders can implement immediately in their formations to make a difference.
Leadership defined
ADP 6-22 defines Leadership, as “the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization”[1]. The Chief of Staff in the Army has initiated a “People First” campaign focused on identifying corrosive and repugnant behavior, and preventing internal attacks on Service members through engaged Leadership. While this deliberate act is honorable and addresses some of the major issues, the external investigation revealed issues missteps, delayed processes and a failure in systems designed to protect the Army’s most valued asset: the Soldier. While many suggest the need for an overhaul current of processes and systems, sexual assault and sexual harassment program, the unpretentious solution is engaged leadership. The Fort Hood incident is not indicative of a larger problem, but a symptom of failed Leadership at multiple levels, from the team to Corps. Simply put, there are gaps in understanding the challenges Soldiers endure on a daily basis that requires engaged leadership to correct. ADP 6-22 also provides the characteristics of Army culture as “Army leaders ensure that they create the conditions for a positive environment, build trust, and cohesion on their team, encourage initiative, demonstrate care for their people, and enhance esprit de corps by connecting current operations to the unit's traditions and history”.[2] Army leaders are approachable when they encourage open, candid communications and observations.” This failure to created the environment leading to the primed to fail phase.
Primed to fail
The Army instituted Foundations day as a method to instill the essence of the initiative “This is my Squad” and has evolved into a monthly requirement. While a valiant effort to address understanding Soldiers, there are already processes in place to understand Soldiers at an individual human level. The following input is based on proven practices that meet the requirement for assessing training challenges, while meeting the intent of addressing the Soldier:
SHARP roles and responsibilities: The Army has made strides towards improving the Sexual assault program and ensuring SMs receive the necessary support and care. The FHIRC report revealed a lack in care, attention to SARC and VA representatives’ requirements. SARCs and Victim advocates should receive the necessary support and attention to their duties. The outcome has been a relegation of cases as after thoughts with little involvement from the individuals responsible for Soldier [3]safety and prosecution: The individuals assigned as SHARP representatives require unique training and education to ensure their craft's professionalization meets guidelines specified by United States Army policy. This ensures that V.A. and SARC personnel's duties will meet the Army's SHARP Program's goal and objectives. Program objectives will, in turn enhance the effectiveness of how proactive reporting and execution of those receiving reporting will portend for the holistic future of the SHARP program. In absence of the above-mentioned recommendations, the SHARP Program will continue to be reduce in importance as a program, with Commanders not investing anytime into, a lack the awareness to commit to stemming this corrosive out of the force and remain in a reactive state with very little awareness of the residual impacts to units. Conversely, if the Army does not want to invest the time and effort into properly educating these Soldiers and Leaders, then the logically step follows: scrap the entire program, force Commanders to be accountable for their inactions/actions in the handling, and administering of cases. This recommendation may appear bold in nature, but the burden of Leadership comes at a steep price and the responsibility level applies to Leaders at each echelon. The outsourcing of SH/SA cases has created a rift between Commanders and their Soldiers, creating the conditions for innocent Service members to be preyed upon before, during, and after reporting of acts. The Army has to start holding Commanders accountable for misdeeds within their units without abdicating these responsibilities to individuals without the UCMJ authority to take action
Sergeants Time Training (STT): Sergeants Time training, conducted weekly every Thursday, was a method to assess training at the squad/section level and below. Additionally, this event was a technique for leaders to discuss one on one with their Soldiers about their personal issues or topics, which would not be discussed openly. STT has been replaced with redundant events linked to requirements to meet readiness collective and individual soldier tasks. The primordial excuse has been that units were preparing for deployments and rotations to Combat Training Centers, when in fact these events were nothing more than trivial requirements that did not lead to any substantial readiness. Preparation for deployments and Readiness requirements overtook this vital training event, therefore creating the seeds of failure at the basic fundamental leadership levels.
Payday activities: Every month, Soldiers and Leaders were required to show up in their Greens or ASUs to ensure that Soldiers understood how to properly wear the dress uniform. Prior to electronic transfer disbursement of pay, pay agents were present to disburse payment to soldiers, thus ensuring first line supervisors understood when their Solders were being payed. Although the pay agents have gone away due to technological advancements, this event served as yet another touch point for Leaders to assess their formations and address issues that otherwise would go unnoticed. Payday activities also served as another measure to assess and counsel Soldiers with underlying issues, serving as another touchpoint for engaged Leadership at the Soldier level.
Lack of Non Commissioned Officers in the barracks/Lack of checks of barracks rooms: NCOs residing in the barracks has a positive effect on the health and welfare of a unit and the good order and discipline when Leadership is absent. However, the removal of NCOs from the barracks coupled with a failure to conduct room checks prior to morning physical training has resulted in events such as Soldiers committing drug offenses within their living areas, discovering slain Soldiers by Brigade level leadership and worse, live-in significant others occupying empty rooms. The aforementioned actions are not to suggest that the inmates are in charge of the asylum, but that Soldiers will continue to be allowed to act in uncouth ways in absence of Leadership if no one provides the proper attention required for barracks living. NCOs are the backbone of the Army and need the support to ensure that the barracks is a safe and sanitary environment intended on providing a space away from the daily grind of work, without fear of loss of life or physical harm. NCOs have a responsibility to for good order and discipline and remain at the forefront of identifying major issues within living quarters, with this obligation extending outside of their internal formations.
Lack of Charge of Quarters (CQ) attentiveness in barracks/company areas: CQs provide an extra layer of protection to ensure Soldiers’ safety and welfare are properly monitored. Units have imparted this responsibility to battalion and brigade level staff duties due to manpower constraints, thus eliminating yet another measure to protect Soldiers during their downtime. CQs, combined with junior NCOs in the barracks, will assist in stemming criminal activity and ensure Soldier safety through hourly checks and processing of occupants within living accommodations.
Formations for accountability: Daily formations are one of the best tried and true tools for accountability and ensure Leaders are able to account for their Soldiers. The Army implemented an update to the Missing Soldier policy 2020-16, ensuring Leadership accounted for Soldiers within a forty-eight hour period, revising the previous policy establishing reporting criteria of the thirty-day policy. This much-needed update to the policy was absolutely needed, but the FHIRC report highlighted the failure to account for Soldiers on a daily basis in an orderly and deliberate manner, leading one to the assumption that formations are viewed as burdensome and a hindrance on Soldier freedom. However, technology enables the force to conduct accountability via text or the multitude of social platforms with this method proving to present challenges to ensuring Soldier safety. The excuse of operating in a COVID environment can easily be defeated by ensuring soldiers wear masks and remain at the proper social distance. COVID is not an excuse for accounting for our Soldiers on a daily basis face to face.
Conclusion: Implementation of systems to protect soldiers
The six aforementioned recommendations as singular variables did not cause the current environment, but combined, effectively caused a fracture between Leaders and their Soldiers. Invariably, Leaders will make mistakes and there is a difference between mistakes, lapses in judgment, and outright disregard for Soldier health and welfare. The implementation of these practices will address the SPC who is being harassed by another Soldier within the unit, the Private who is encountering issues with his pay, the SPC who is afraid to speak up that the barracks is a scary place to reside during the weekend, or the Lieutenant who is afraid to tell their Battalion Commander that the training schedule is not sufficient to meet the needs to their training goals. Who was at fault matters less than the need for engaged leadership to instill a climate and culture that truly supports and protects America’s Soldiers. The CSA’s focus on “People First” and the CSA CSM’s “This is my Squad” initiatives are noble foundations to ensuring Soldier care and safety, but the only realistic method is Leader engagement and true care regarding the Army’s most valuable resource: the Soldier. Army policies have a tendency to be watered down the further down the chain of command and have the potential to further erode the trust of Soldiers and Leaders alike. Genuinely concerned Leaders are obligated and duty bound to ensure their Soldiers are cared for in the best manner possible, and that they are provided with the resources to address issues within their formations. Finally, the Army must hold itself and its leaders accountable and remain transparent in doing so. Analytics and studies are great for providing the literature and numbers, but there are already systems in place to protect Soldiers and sometimes going to the past reveals tried and true methods to address these issues rather than a bumper sticker slogan, which holds little to no merit. In order to “right the ship”, Leaders should utilize the tools at their disposal to the maximum extent to ensure the health and welfare of the force is maintained and strengthened.
COVID is not an excuse, silence is not an excuse, lack of knowledge is not an excuse, and readiness is not an excuse. As an institution, it is our responsibility to ensure America’s sons and daughters are provided engaged and caring Leaders. The Army has to conduct a course correction or risk a break in the bond of trust and confidence with the citizens and civilian leadership its serves.
“Leaders need to get back to leading and inspiring and no longer surrender to their soldiers' wants- a continued behavior leads to total failure across the ranks and organizations. When we try to please everybody, everything fails.”-miscellaneous Former Brigade Commander
[1] ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession: JUL 2019. Headquarters Department of the Army, pg 1-13
[2] Dept. of the Army, pg 5-8